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INTRODUCTION
The American agricultural industry has long enjoyed special
status in the eyes of Congress. The twin rallying cries of safe food
supply and satisfied constituents have proven to be an intoxicating
siren's call to vote-starved politicians seeking to distribute favors via
omnibus farm bills.1 However, the crushing cost of commodity
subsidies-over 165 billion dollars in the past eight years-brings into
question the long-term viability of such programs? The family farm is
a different entity than it was at the inception of subsidy programs
during the New Deal,3 but Congress has not changed subsidies apace,
resulting in misallocated and profligate spending.4 The issue of how
to restructure the subsidy programs becomes more urgent as a record
1. See infra Parts I.B-C (discussing the history of subsidy programs, including the
Food Security Act of 1985, the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990,
and the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002).
2. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
APPLICATION OF PAYMENT LIMITATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE 8-12 (Aug. 2003)
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (examining the effects of possible limitations of
agriculture subsidies and concluding that increased regulation of the timing and nature of
payments is essential to the long-term viability of such programs),
http://www.usda.gov/oce/oce/payments/paymentLimitsAll.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Id. app. A at 131-35 (listing farm subsidy amounts and types over
the past eight years).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 24-35 (2001-2002)
[hereinafter AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK] (noting the growth in the size of farms,
diversification in operations, and shrinking number of farmers from the turn of the century
to present), http://www.usda.gov/factbook/2002factbook.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
4. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, app. A at 131-35 (noting the amount
spent on various farm subsidy programs since 1996); see also Brian M. Riedl, The Cost of
America's Subsidy Binge: An Average of $1 Million Per Farm, BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 10,
2001, at 3 (stating that based on analysis of estimates by the Congressional Budget Office
and subsequent actual expenditures on farm subsidies, "annual 'emergency payments' to
farmers have increased the amount of government farm payments by 67 percent over
projected expenditures" from 1990 to 2001), http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Agriculture/BG1510.cfrn (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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budget deficit has Congress looking to cut spending, which may
endanger even longstanding beneficiaries such as the agriculture
industry.
However, without subsidies, American agriculture cannot
compete in a global industry where subsidies, whether direct or
indirect, are crucial to a nation's competitiveness in the international
market.' For farmers, subsidies are not easily foregone, since
subsidization of commodities and crop insurance enable American
farmers to compete against nations with lower production costs and
looser environmental regulations.6 In a very real sense, American
farmers feel that the contributions they make to American society in
the form of affordable and safe food fully entitles them to whatever
compensation they receive in the form of federal subsidies.7
The issue then becomes whether a mutually satisfactory balance
can be struck between the interests of taxpayers and agricultural
producers, a solution that simultaneously lowers costs to taxpayers
and increases benefits for producers. Efforts have been made in the
past to restructure federal involvement in the American agricultural
system, but the efforts have largely been aimed at reallocation of
scarce federal funds, which has done little to placate either party.'
What is needed is a new approach, one that reflects the strengths of
the American economy: political stability and a highly developed
financial infrastructure.
Securitization refers to the use of financial instruments to pool
5. See Formulation of the 2002 Farm Bill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General
Farm Commodities, and Risk Management, H.R. Comm. on Agriculture, 107th Cong. 107-
10, at 797-1013 (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.AG 8/1:107-10) [hereinafter 107th Congress
Hearings] (noting the various justifications for increasing payments under the 2002 farm
bill).
6. Id. Some of the United States' major competitors in the global agricultural
market, such as China and Brazil, have lower environmental standards than the United
States. The United States has argued that other competitors, such as the nations
comprising the European Union, subsidize producers at rates equal to or in excess of
American subsidies, thus lowering the effective cost of production for those nations. See
Edward Alden & Deborah MacGregor, A Cash Crop, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at 18.
Whether other nations subsidize agriculture directly or indirectly, without some form of
federal assistance American farmers would be at a huge disadvantage in comparison to
global competitors. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
7. See 107th Congress Hearings, supra note 5, at 857-58 (statement of Chuck
Nichols) (stating "[olur family has been involved in California agriculture for the past
forty-five years .... [olur company uses USDA Market Assistance Program funds ....
[w]e cannot stop, and should not stop, the countries of the world from improving their
ability to produce, process and market agricultural crops, but should not continue to have
American farmers bear the entire cost").
8. See infra Part I.B (discussing subsidy program history).
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illiquid assets, separate them from their originators, and offer them as
securities on capital markets.' This Comment proposes that the
efficiencies created by securitization would benefit investors and
farmers, while simultaneously lowering the cost of the federal subsidy
programs, through what has been described by one commentator as
the "alchemy" of securitization. 1° By bundling commodities into
securities, which can be offered on the capital markets, the
government can tap the dollars of investors without forcing all
taxpayers, investors or not, to bear the entire burden of
subsidization.1 The proceeds of the securitization would be delivered
to farmers in sufficient amount and time to enable them to produce
the crops that the nation depends on for its food supply. 2 Investors
would be offered a diversified investment with a guaranteed return. 3
This Comment argues that federal securitization is preferable to
direct subsidies because it offers cheap capital to all farmers rather
than disproportionately favoring those who are already profitable. In
this way, the federal government can more directly benefit struggling,
smaller farms without penalizing more profitable farms, as it currently
does by capping direct subsidies. By sponsoring commodity-backed
securities on the capital markets, Congress can begin to close the gap
between the rhetoric and the reality concerning American
agriculture.
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the policy and
history of American crop subsidies and outlines the provisions of the
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which contains the
current commodity subsidization legislation. 4 Part II introduces the
general concepts of securitization and provides an overview of the
issues unique to agricultural commodity securitizations. Part III
offers a model for the federal securitization of commodities to replace
the current direct subsidy system. By utilizing this model to take
advantage of the United States capital markets, Congress can procure
the funds needed to advance the goal of developing the "most
efficient and reliable means to produce our food."'5
9. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 134 (1994).
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part III.A.2.
13. See infra Part III.A.4.
14. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134-42, 509-10 (2002) (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-19, 7931-36 (West Supp. 2004)).
15. See H.R. COMM. ON AGRIC., 106th CONG., REVIEW OF FEDERAL FARM POLICY
6 (Comm. Print 2000) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4. AG 8/1:106-50/pt.1) (statement of Rep. Bill
[Vol. 83
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I. THE FEDERAL SUBSIDIZATION FRAMEWORK
A. Policy Reasons for Subsidizing Agriculture
Completely eliminating agricultural subsidies would be the least
costly alternative for the federal government (and hence taxpayers) in
the short-term. 16  However, as outlined below, there are several
reasons why agriculture is subsidized in the United States, and it is
important to understand the policy reasons underlying subsidization
before methods to improve it can be identified.
By taxing all consumers and redistributing money to commodity
producers, the cost of commodities to everyone may be reduced.
While this may disproportionately favor taxpayers who use more
commodities, it also results in affordable, safe food for the entire
population, meeting consumer expectations.
While the reasons for keeping the general populace fed and
clothed in a relatively affordable and safe manner are fairly obvious-
imagine the outrage if food and clothing prices suddenly doubled or
tripled-there are also national security reasons advanced for
encouraging domestic production. 7  Increasing dependency on
imported fossil fuels underscores the necessity of avoiding a similar
situation regarding other commodities, since dependence on imported
basic commodities puts the United States at the mercy of another
nation's whims and political prerogatives." The necessity of keeping
citizens fed makes a self-sustaining agricultural industry particularly
Barret) ("[W]e must continue to develop the most efficient and reliable means to produce
our food"), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hagfarml3.000/
hagfarml3_0f.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
16. The position that subsidies should be eliminated altogether is not without
adherents. See David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for
Agriculture: Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 13 (2002) (stating that current subsidy policies provide "incentives and ...
bias against alternative agricultural methods under U.S. policies"); J. Bishop Grewell,
Farm Subsidies are Harm Subsidies, AM. ENTERPRISE, Oct.-Nov. 2003, at 49 (stating that
"[f]arm subsidies ... [are] perverse: not good for the environment, not good for farmers,
and not good for consumers"); Hurtful Farm Subsidies, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at B10
(noting the dampening effect subsidies in developed countries have on global trade).
17. Daniel A. Sumner, FOOD SECURITY, TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY 1
(Sept. 10, 2000) (noting that "[n]ational agricultural policies are often rationalized on
'food security' grounds," meaning that a nation's overall security is directly related to how
reliably it can feed its citizens), http://www.aic.ucdavis.edu/research/fs9.10.00.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
18. In the United States in 2004, imports of oil totaled about sixty-one percent of
consumption; forty percent of 2002 oil imports came from OPEC member nations. See
Gibson Consulting, Some Interesting Oil Industry Statistics, at http://www.gravmag.com/
oil.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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important; it is one thing if China decides to stop shipping plastic toys
to the United States and quite another if Brazil decides to stop
shipping soybeans. Similarly, while industrial production may not be
as vital an interest as feeding the populace, domestic manufacturers
also depend on cheap, reliable sources of commodities.
Other nations also subsidize commodity producers, and the
United States argues that it must do the same to maintain global
parity. 9 If Brazil can produce soybeans for $2.00 a bushel because its
government adopts a policy of giving producers free land and relaxing
pesticide and herbicide regulations, then Brazilian producers could
flood the American market with soybeans at a price below that at
which American producers can break even. Likewise, if the Japanese
government subsidizes its rice producers with a payment equal to
$1.50 a kilogram, then Japanese producers can effectively sell their
rice for $1.50 less than competitors who do not receive such a
subsidy.20 Achieving global parity in the area of agriculture has
become a major issue in global trade talks, as poorer nations argue
that they are frozen out of international markets by the subsidy
policies of wealthier nations.2
To ensure domestic stability and to compete globally, some form
of subsidization of commodity production has become a practical and
political necessity. Despite increasingly vociferous cries to end or
limit subsidies,22 reality dictates that it is a foregone conclusion that at
19. See Farmer's Market, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at A10 (noting that the three
entities that subsidize agriculture most heavily-the United States, the European Union,
and Japan-all argue they must do so to remain competitive with each other, to the
detriment of developing nations that cannot afford subsidies and thus cannot compete);
see also 107th Congress Hearings, supra note 5, at 1299 (statement of Rep. Everett)
(stating that farmers find it difficult to compete against countries where labor is cheaper
and compliance with environmental regulation less onerous).
20. Farmer's Market, supra note 19 (noting that competitors in the Japanese market
must "climb a 490% tariff wall" in order to sell their products).
21. See id. (noting that a proposed drop in the agricultural subsidy programs of the
European Union, Japan, and the United States "[a]t long last [allows] poor countries ...
to participate more fully in the world trading system"). The lobbying efforts of special
interest groups have often been cited as a reason for agricultural subsidies, as well. See,
e.g., John C. Roberts III & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1809-11 (2003) (noting
that, in general, groups that are more organized and intentional in efforts to gain
governmental concessions receive a disproportionate level of benefit in relation to their
relative size); The Unlikeliest Scourge, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 22-24 (noting the
effect that certain lobby groups-in particular, sugar-had on shaping the current Farm
Bill).
22. See Franz Fischler, Why Can't America Be More Like Us?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19,
2004, at A12 (arguing that the European Union has made a "whopping 70% reduction in
trade-distorting farm support," and urging the United States to do the same).
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least some federal subsidies will be provided for the foreseeable
future, and the issue then becomes finding the most effective and
efficient way to provide them.
B. Background of Commodity Subsidization in the United States
In the twentieth century, the face of agriculture changed
dramatically. Consolidation has resulted in larger farms and fewer
farmers. 3 Although ninety-eight percent of farms are identified by
the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") as "family
farms," many are organized as corporations.24 In 1940, there were six
million farms averaging 150 acres each.25 By the late 1990s, there
were only about 2.2 million farms averaging 447 acres in size.26
During roughly this same period, farm employment declined
dramatically-from 12.5 million in 1930 to 1.2 million in the 1990s-
even as the total population of the United States more than
doubled.2 7 By 2000, sixty percent of farmers worked only part-time
on farms; they held other, non-farm jobs to supplement their farm
income.28
The current subsidy system must be considered in the context of
the shrinking number and increasing size of American farms because
the original subsidy program was constituted on the assumption of
many small farms and operators. 9 Proponents of agricultural subsidy
programs continue to employ the rhetoric of the "family farm" in
justifying payments to the agricultural industry.30  However, the
23. The number of farms comprising 500 acres or more increased from four percent in
1935 to eighteen percent in 1997. See AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 25.
The number of total farms in the United States has steadily declined since 1935, from a
high of nearly seven million, to just under two million in 1997. id. at 24.
24. Id. at 29. Corporate ownership has also changed who actually owns the land that
is being farmed. In 1997, sixty percent of farmers identified themselves as full owners of
their farms. See NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICAL SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1997 CENSUS
OF AGRICULTURE, http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/highlights/usasum/
usjfigl.gif (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The remainder farmed rented
land or partially owned the land they farmed. Id.
25. See CHRISTOPHER CONTE & ALBERT R. KARR, American Agriculture: It's
Changing Significance, in AN OUTLINE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY (Feb. 2001),





29. See id. (noting the number of farms and the relatively small size of subsidy
distributions in the 1940s).
30. See generally 107th Congress Hearings, supra note 5 (gathering the statements of
over 175 farmers for the purpose of assessing the need for federal assistance to American
farms).
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family farmer of today is as likely to own a large, incorporated
operation with several employees as he is to resemble the dour
patriarch depicted in American Gothic.3
Federal subsidization of American agriculture was first embraced
as a formal policy with the creation of the federal Farm Board by
President Herbert Hoover in 1929.32 The primary purpose of the
Farm Board was to gather and to distribute information regarding
sound farming practices, but the Great Depression soon brought into
sharp relief the need for greater economic assistance for farmers.33 In
response to the burgeoning economic crisis, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt proposed, and Congress approved, a sweeping system of
price supports and quotas limiting farm production.34 This system
came to be known as the "parity system" because of its central theory
that prices should be pegged to a target price predicated on a
favorable market year.35 Should prices fall below the target, the
federal government would sponsor a subsidy to make up the
difference.36
By the 1950s, rapidly developing agricultural production
techniques had made farmers their own worst enemies; because of
much higher average yields, overproduction was glutting the market
and making the parity subsidy system more expensive.37 Rising
agricultural production made the price support system, at least in its
New Deal incarnation, prohibitively expensive by the early 1970s.38
Congress could not afford subsidies at the old levels, but did not
retreat from its policy of subsidizing agriculture.3 9 In 1973, the first
form of modern "deficiency payments" was enacted.4" Deficiency
31. Although ninety-two percent of farms are still classified as "small" (meaning gross
revenues of less than $250,000) by the USDA, the remaining eight percent, which includes
large family farms and family owned corporations, account for sixty-eight percent of
production. AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 24-29. American Gothic is a
painting by Grant Wood depicting what is ostensibly the typical sober Midwestern farmer
around the turn of the century. The painting can be viewed online at
http://www.skfriends.com/american-gothic.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).




36. See id. ("In years of overproduction, when crop prices fell below the parity level,
the government agreed to buy the excess.").
37. See id.
38. See id. (noting that the cost of government price supports rose dramatically
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payments were similar to the parity system in that a target market
price was set and if the market price fell below the target price, the
federal government would make up the difference.4 However, as a
condition on the receipt of government funds, farmers were required
to remove land from production.4 2 By the early 1980s, almost twenty-
five percent of American cropland had been idled.43
Idle cropland and lower support prices did not mean a cheaper
farm program. Payments to agricultural producers exceeded $20
billion annually by the 1980s.' Nor did subsidy payments prevent
thousands of agricultural bankruptcies in the 1980s, as farmers paid
the price for borrowing at inflationary interest rates to expand
production.45 Taxpayers were also disgruntled with programs that
paid farmers a "ransom" not to produce commodities.46 Amid calls
for smaller government, Congress responded by passing the Food
Security Act of 1985, 47 which reduced support prices and allowed for
the idling of more land.48 Although the 1985 Act did not represent a
major policy shift, improvements in the economy contributed to lower
overall subsidy payouts.49 By the late 1980s, though, ballooning
payments forced Congress to reconsider its strategy once again.50
Congress responded with the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and
Trade Act of 1990,51 which reduced the amount of deficiency
payments and encouraged growing new crops traditionally outside the
subsidization structure.5 2  Price supports for existing crops were





45. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BANKRUPTCIES: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF FARMER BANKRUPTCY (Aug. 9, 2004),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/bankruptcies/BankruptciesHistory.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
46. See id.
47. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified at 7
U.S.C.A. § 1421 (West Supp. 2004)).
48. Id.
49. See CONTE & KARR, supra note 25. The lower cost of production inputs, such as
fuel, fertilizer costs, and improving commodity prices combined to make farms more
profitable independent of subsidies. See id.
50. See id.
51. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
2004)).
52. See CONTE & KARR, supra note 25.
53. See id. (stating that "[t]he new law retained high and rigid price supports for
certain commodities").
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The mid-1990s saw the election of a Republican Congress
determined to cut costs, and the Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform ("FAIR") Act of 199611 represented a drastic departure
from previous federal agricultural policy.5 6  Gone were the
restrictions on planting; gone also were the most lucrative production
and price support payments.57 These payments were replaced with
new, lower, fixed payments that were not pegged to target prices.58
Instead, payments were made based on ownership of productive
cropland and a small "marketing assistance" subsidy of
commodities.59 To smooth the transition from a system that many
producers had been familiar with their entire lives, Congress
earmarked $36 billion in fixed payments over seven years.6° The
crashing commodity market of the late 1990s soon exhausted those
payments, 61 and Congress was forced to pass a series of emergency
bills that re-implemented the target price methodology of previous
bills.6' By 2000, farm subsidy payments exceeded $29.8 billion for a
54. See id.
55. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
110 Stat. 888 (commodity subsidy changes codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (West Supp.
2004)).
56. See 110 Stat. at 896-904. For an analysis of the passage of legislation that
represents a change in the political landscape see Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 21,
at 1810 (stating that "[t]he Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, a
centerpiece of the free market reform agenda championed by the Republican-controlled
House, reversed decades of national policy by eliminating most agricultural subsidies").
57. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1421(a)-(e) (West Supp. 2004) (outlining the new system based
on fixed payments).
58. See CONTE & KARR, supra note 25.
59. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1421(a), (d).
60. See CONTE & KARR, supra note 25. The fixed payments were not contingent on
production and were sometimes paid out on the basis of being in the business of farming
or, in some cases, merely for owning eligible land. See Philip Brasher, Farm co-ops, giant
farms benefit from bypassing limits, BISMARCK TRIB. (N.D.), Oct. 1, 2001, at 2A (noting
that landholding companies and other entities collected farm subsidies simply by dint of
owning land).
61. See LARRY COMBEST, RESPONDING TO THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC CRISIS
ADVERSELY AFFECTING AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, H.R. REP. No. 107-
111, at 5 (2001), reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 318, 319. Combest explained:
In 2000, crop prices were at a 27-year low for soybeans, a 25-year low for cotton, a
14-year low for wheat and corn and an 8-year low for rice .... The current farm
recession, in its fourth year, ranks among the deepest in our nation's history, along
with the Great Depression, the post-World War I and II recessions, and the
financial ruin of the 1980s.
Id.
62. See Sarah Feinberg, Press Release, Environmental Working Group, Congress To
Approve Emergency Farm Aid for Fourth Year-5.5 Billion Added to Subsidies (June
26, 2000) (noting that in 2000, for the fourth straight year, Congress had been forced to
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single year, a new record.63 The clamor for restructuring led Congress
to overhaul the subsidy system again in 2002.64
C. Current Agricultural Subsidization: FSRIA
1. Introduction
The overhaul of the subsidy system was accomplished by the new
commodity programs established by the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act ("FSRIA"), which were implemented in 2002.65 The
scope of this Comment does not allow full examination of FSRIA, an
enormous and enormously complex statute.66 The analysis will be
limited to direct federal subsidies of American agricultural
commodities, the area where the switch to securitization offers the
most possibilities for improvement.67 The FSRIA also subsidizes crop
insurance against weather loss and continues an extensive program
designed to reduce the amount of land in production.6" These
programs are statutorily separate from the subsidization program, but
supplement the 1996 FAIR Act that was intended to end farm supports),
http://www.ewg.org/reportslfarmfairness/ (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FY 2002 BUDGET SUMMARY,
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2002/master2OO2.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also Brian M. Riedl, Agriculture Lobby Wins Big in New
Farm Bill, BACKGROUNDER, at 2 (Apr. 9, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Agriculture/BG1534.cfm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
64. For a sample of how the 1996 FAIR Act was viewed among farmers, see 107th
Congress Hearings, supra note 5, at 809-10, 813 (statement of Andrew Quinn, corn and
soybean farmer from Minnesota) (criticizing the payment system under the FAIR Act as
unfairly favoring certain commodities-such as soybeans-and criticizing the difficulty of
re-incorporating farmland enrolled in set-aside programs).
65. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (commodity subsidy programs codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7901-19, 7931-36 (West Supp.
2004)).
66. Titles under the FSRIA include: Commodity Programs (Title I); Conservation
(Title II); Trade (Title III); Nutrition Programs (Title IV); Credit (Title V); Rural
Development (Title VI); Research and Related Matters (Title VII); and Crop Insurance
(Title X). This Comment is concerned primarily with the commodity subsidization
provisions of Title I codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 7901-19, 7931-36.
67. Subsidized commodities include: wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland
cotton, rice, soybeans, and other oilseeds. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7901(4) (listing "covered
commodities" under the FSRIA).
68. The Food Security Act of 1985 authorized the Conservation Reserve Program
("CRP"), which is still in effect and governed by the provisions of 7 C.F.R. § 1410 (2004).
See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FACT SHEET: CONSERVATION
RESERVE PROGRAM, (Feb. 1997), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/crpl.pdf
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The CRP
essentially pays agriculture producers to plant "long-term, resource conserving covers" on
ecologically fragile land, effectively removing it from commodity production. Id.
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often influence cropping decisions.
The subsidy paid per crop is the result of many factors, such as
the nature of the crop, historic subsidy levels for the crop, and policy
decisions by Congress.69 Subsidies are roughly weighted to reflect the
differing yields of each commodity and are based on a "target" price
for each commodity." Additionally, the government makes a fixed
payment to landowners every year based on the historic yield of
agricultural land in production.7" To receive subsidies, a producer
must meet the requirements of the FSRIA including, inter alia, that
he is an owner, landlord, tenant, or sharecropper on a farm that has
produced the eligible commodities.72 Compliance with conservation
measures is also required.73 Commodity subsidization under FSRIA
provides for four different types of payments. The Direct Payment
("DP") is a fixed payment based on historic yield on acres in
production.74 The Counter-Cyclical Payment ("CCP") is a variable
payment that is employed when market prices fall below a target
price.75 The Marketing Assistance Loan ("MAL") is a Farm Service
Agency ("FSA") loan to producers based on the amount of
commodity a farmer has harvested and stored7 6 The Loan Deficiency
Payment ("LDP") is a variable payment based on actual harvested
69. See 107th Congress Hearings, supra note 5, at 13-14 (statement of Rep. Saxby
Chambliss) (noting that historic subsidy levels and the nature of the crop being subsidized
should be taken into account when determining target prices). More cynical parties note
the effects of political pressure brought to bear by special interest groups, and the effect
this can have on congressional allocations of funds. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
70. If market prices fall below the target price, the federal government will make up
the difference. Commodity subsidy target prices vary from county to county. Specified
loan rates for every county in the United States can be viewed at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/psd/loanrate.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). County levels are pegged to a federal target price, which
can be found at 7 U.S.C.A. § 7914.
71. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7913(a) (stating that payments will be made to producers for
whom payment yields and base acres have been calculated). 7 U.S.C.A. § 7915 contains
requirements intended to ensure that these payments end up in the hands of producers,
but Congress has had little success in preventing non-farmers from receiving subsidies
intended for farms. See Brasher, supra note 60 (noting that payment limits are routinely
bypassed by large agricultural entities).
72. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7915. For a more in-depth review of the eligibility requirements of
the FSRIA see generally Christopher R. Kelley, Introduction to Federal Farm Program
Payment Legislation and Payment Eligibility Law, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 11, 11-37 (2002).
73. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7915(a).
74. See infra Part I.C.2.
75. See infra Part I.C.3.
76. See infra Part I.C.4; see also infra note 79 (discussing the responsibilities of the
FSA).
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acres and actual harvested bushels.77
The following discussion outlines the relevant provisions of the
current commodity subsidy program and examines their effects on
farmers.
2. Direct Payments
a. Purpose and Methodology
Direct payments are based on calculations made employing the
"program yield." Program yield is the amount of crop (usually
measured in bushels) eligible for subsidy and is based on the historic
production of a farm. 8 Program yield can be calculated using one of
three methods, which the farmer may choose at his or her discretion.
79
The first method of calculating program yield is to multiply the
average yield for the previous three years by ninety-three and one
half percent."0 This method favors producers who have higher yields
in recent production years. Because commodity production has
trended upward over the past four decades,81 many producers will
choose this option.
The second method allows the producer to keep the "old" yields,
that is, those calculated under the FAIR Act, which used similar
algorithms to those used in the FSRIA.82 This option would likely be
favored by producers whose yield is static or dropping.
The third method is to use the old yields (those established for
the FAIR Act) plus seventy percent of the difference between old
yields and the average from the last three years.83  This is a
compromise position for those producers whose yield has risen, but
77. See id. LDP is derived from MAL and is not actually a separate subsidy but rather
a different form of payment. Id.
78. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7912(b).
79. Id. § 7912(e)(3). Although the method of calculation is subject to the producer's
discretion, the Farm Service Agency is currently responsible for administering the
agricultural subsidy programs. See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., About
Us: Mission and Goals, at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/about-fsa/mission.htm (last visited
Jan. 8, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The FSA determines
payment eligibility and distributes payments via localized boards. County by county
contact information is available at http://oip.usda.gov/scripts/ndisapi.dll/oipagency/
index?state=us&agency=fsa (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
80. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7912(e)(3)(B).
81. AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 24 (noting the general upward trend
in average agricultural yields in the United States).
82. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7912(b).
83. Id. § 7912(e)(3)A.
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not enough to meet the efficiency threshold of the first option.
Once program yield is calculated, it can only be applied to base
acres. Base acres are those registered in the federal programs.
84
The Direct Payment is calculated by multiplying the payment
rate per bushel by program yield, then multiplying by eighty-five
percent of base acres." For example, a farmer who owns 1000 acres
with a program yield of 100 bushels of corn will be eligible for a DP
on 85,000 bushels. The DP rate for corn under the FSRIA is $0.28
per bushel.86 Thus, the farmer is eligible for a DP of $23,800 per year.
A producer may receive no more than $40,000 in DP every
year.87 The DP is a fixed payment in the sense that it is paid
regardless of the current year's production. DPs are made after
October 1 in the year of harvest.88
b. Effects on Producers
Because the DP is paid soon enough to offset the costs of the
new growing season, it comes the closest to providing cheap capital to
producers in a timely fashion to pay for planting and operating costs.
However, the payment caps preclude many producers from fully
taking advantage of the program and forces them to borrow
elsewhere to meet capital needs. To close the gap, farmers may take
out loans sufficient to meet their needs for the growing season with a
private financial intermediary and repay out of the proceeds of the
subsidies, which are received after harvest. This is an unnecessary
duplication of transactions and may result in extra costs to the
producer.
3. Counter-Cyclical Payments
a. Purpose and Methodology
The Counter-Cyclical Payment is the amount a producer is paid
when national average prices are below the target levels specified in
84. See id. § 7901(a)(2) (defining base acres as "the number of acres established ...
with respect to the covered commodity on the election made by the owner of the farm").
85. Id. § 7901(f). The payment rate per bushel is pre-determined and varies by
differing commodity. See id. § 7913(b).
86. Id. § 7913(b)(2).
87. See id. § 1308(3)(b)(1) (stating that"[t]he total amount of direct payments made to
a person during any crop year ... 1 or more covered commodities may not exceed
$40,000.").
88. Id. § 7913(d)(1)(B).
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FSRIA by more than the amount of the DP rate.89 The CCP is
intended to address only major shortfalls in the market price. As the
market price rises near the target price, the CCP is lessened. If
market prices are significantly below the target price, there is
increasing liability on the part of the government.
The payment rate is calculated by subtracting the national season
average market price from the target price.' ° The DP is then
subtracted from the result.91 For example, if the national season
average market price is $2.30 per bushel, this is $0.30 less than the
target price for corn, $2.60.' Thus, the producer of 100,000 bushels of
corn is eligible for a gross CCP of $30,000. Any DP is subtracted
from the gross CCP, so if we continue the prior example and the
producer had already received $23,800 in DP, then he would be
eligible for a net CCP of $6,200.
Payment levels per producer, per year, are capped at $65,000. 93
CCPs are paid at a ratio of thirty-five percent in October of the
harvest year, thirty-five percent in February, and the remainder after
the end of the twelve month marketing period for the covered
commodity.94 The CCP is paid regardless of the price actually
received by the producer, since it is predicated on a national average
price. It is variable with the amount of bushels produced.95
b. Effects on Producers
The CCP does little to truly protect producers against market
swings, because the payment is not distributed until up to a year after
the crop is sold. A low market price for commodities can reduce
income, making it difficult for producers to repay loans taken out for
the growing season. Private loans must be extended until sufficient
subsidy payments have been made to repay the loans, increasing
interest and transaction costs. This can damage credit ratings and
89. Id. § 7914(a)-(b).
90. Id. § 7914(d)(1)-(2).
91. Id. § 7914(b).
92. See id. § 7914(c)(1) (establishing 2002 and 2003 target prices for eligible
commodities including wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, and oats).
93. See id. § 1308(c)(1) (stating that "the total amount of counter-cyclical payments
made to a person during any crop year ... for 1 or more covered commodities may not
exceed $65,000").
94. Id. § 7914(f)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
95. See id. § 7914(d)(1)-(2) (noting that the payment rate is the difference between
market price and target price for the "covered commodity").
96. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (outlining the CCP payment
schedule).
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make it difficult to procure credit on favorable terms for the next
growing season. As expensive capital makes the farm less profitable,
this further damages credit, and the cycle continues until the farmer
can no longer profitably farm. The CCP can prolong the viability of a
farm by mitigating the effect of low commodity prices, but the timing
of the payments forces the farmer to carry interest costs until
payment is made, lessening the help such payments provide.
Additionally, because the CCP is tied to market prices, it
provides a free hedge for producers who have the resources to take
advantage of it. A hedge is essentially a bet that the market will
move in the opposite direction from a previous position.97 For
example, a producer may forward contract all of his soybeans for
delivery in November at a price of $6.00. If the price subsequently
goes up, the farmer loses all the potential benefit of the price
increase, because he has already sold his soybeans. To offset this risk,
the farmer may purchase an option to buy soybeans at $6.00 in
November (a "call '98) at the same time that he sells his soybeans.
Any rise in price will make his call more valuable, since it represents
the right to purchase soybeans at a price more favorable than market
prices. The CCP acts as a down hedge; any price drop below a certain
level will be reimbursed to farmers by the federal government
(subject to the cap). Thus, a producer can "bet" that the market price
will go down by selling short, and if the market price goes down,
benefit from the position taken with options, while at the same time
not be greatly hurt by falling market prices because of the federal
subsidy. However, this system favors more profitable farmers who
have the resources to afford the price of the options, as well as the
time and sophistication to develop market positions. Like the other
subsidies, the utility of the CCP is increased for profitable producers,
to the detriment of less profitable producers.
97. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358
(1982) (explaining that farmers and other market participants often take speculative
positions to protect against price declines or increases, depending on their exposure to the
market).
98. See, e.g., Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
that a call option is "a promise by the writer to deliver the underlying instrument at a price
fixed in advance (the 'strike price') if the option is exercised within a set time"). Like
hedging, a call option is a risk management tool that allows market risk to be spread over
a number of parties. Id. A commodity option is an option to buy or sell a commodity.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1127 (8th ed. 2004).
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4. Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments
a. Purpose and Methodology
Marketing Assistance Loans are loans made to producers by the
Farm Service Agency based on the amount of the commodity that a
farmer actually holds.99 These loans are intended to give farmers the
capital necessary to store their commodity and continue operations
while waiting for favorable market conditions in which to sell their
commodity.100 The amount the FSA will loan a farmer is calculated
using the "loan rate," which is the statutory price set for a given
commodity."0' For example, if a farmer has 30,000 bushels of corn in
the bin after harvest, the FSA will loan him the value of the
commodity as determined by the statutory loan price. If the price of
corn rises, the farmer may sell the corn, repay the FSA, and keep the
difference." z  If the price of corn drops below the loan rate, the
farmer has the option of simply turning over the commodity that was
pledged as collateral, regardless of the prevailing market price at the
time the loan is due;0 3 because the loan is non-recourse, the farmer is
not required to repay at the rate at which he borrowed.1 °4
A producer may opt not to take out a loan on the stored
commodities and instead be eligible to receive the difference between
the market price on the day he sells and the loan price, if the market
price is below the loan price.105 Such a payment is known as a Loan
99. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7931(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2004) (noting the availability of loan
deficiency payment and marketing assistance loans); see also FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., FACT SHEET: NONRECOURSE MARKETING ASSISTANCE LOAN AND
LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENT PROGRAM 1 (June 2003) [hereinafter MAL & LDP FACT
SHEET] (noting that loans can only be given for an eligible commodity that is pledged as
collateral) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
100. See MAL& LDPFACT SHEET, supra note 99, at 1.
101. See id. (noting that the marketing assistance loan is only available for commodities
pledged as collateral); see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 7932 (listing loan prices for eligible
commodities).
102. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7934(b)(1)-(2) (stating that producers shall be permitted to
repay at the lesser of the "loan rate ... established under § 7932 ... plus interest" or the
"prevailing world market price... as determined by the Secretary").
103. See id. In actuality, the farmer would probably sell the commodity, repay the FSA
whatever the proceeds were, and keep the difference, rather than physically turn over the
commodity.
104. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7931(a) (noting the availability of "non-recourse" loans to
eligible producers through 2007). However, in lieu of repayment of the loaned funds, the
farmer must deliver the crop he' borrowed on as collateral. See MAL & LDP FACT
SHEET, supra note 99, at 1.
105. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 7935(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)-(B) (noting that a producer may agree to
forego obtaining the loan in return for loan deficiency payments in the amount of the
difference between the loan rate and the prevailing market price).
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Deficiency Payment. LDPs are made from the time of harvest until
May 31st of the following year for corn and soybeans. °6
The LDP is a production-based subsidy; hence, it is variable with
the amount of commodity produced. There is a tremendous risk of
liability to the government if commodity prices fall below the loan
rate. A 4,000 acre farm producing 500,000 bushels of corn yearly is
eligible for a $250,000 subsidy if the market price is $0.50 below the
loan rate. This risk became painfully obvious in the late 1990s when
corn and soybean market prices were thirty to forty percent below the
loan rates. 107 In response to ballooning LDPs to the largest producers
(ostensibly those in least need of such payments), Congress enacted a
cap on LDPs at $75,000 per year, per producer. 108
b. Effects on Producers
The LDP seeks to solve the problem of low profitability by
agreeing to pay more for the products struggling farms produce.
However, directly subsidizing production also favors producers who
do not need subsidies. The federal government attempts to act as a
gatekeeper by enacting caps, which it hopes will screen out large
producers who do not need subsidies.0 9 Because the size of a farm is
not necessarily a proxy for profitability, nor is it a proxy for non-
family ownership, caps can also harm unprofitable and/or family
farms, which is not the intent of Congress. 110
The producer has the option of borrowing money directly from
the federal government under the LDP program, but few choose to
do so because of the increased transaction costs. Often, if the
producer requires a loan at harvest, private interest rates will be
competitive with the government loan rate, making two institutions
redundant. The efficient choice (that is, least transactions) for a
producer is to simply be paid the difference in the loan price, rather
106. See MAL & LDP FACT SHEET, supra note 99, at 5.
107. See NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICAL SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL
PRICES 1997-98 SUMMARY 31-39 (July 1998) (noting the historically low prices for corn,
soybeans and wheat in the late 1990s), http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/
price/zap-bb/agpran98.txt (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
108. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1308(d)(1) (stating that "[t]he total amount... that a person may
receive during any crop year may not exceed $75,000").
109. The federal government also sees caps as a way of limiting spending, of course.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
110. See 107th Congress Hearings, supra note 5, at 797-99 (statement of Rep.
Chambliss) (noting that payment limitations hurt both profitable and unprofitable
farmers, and noting the various devices used to avoid them, calling into question the
efficacy of lowering payments by caps). For an in-depth analysis of payment caps under
FSRIA see generally Kelley, supra note 72.
[Vol. 83
TURNING STRAW INTO GOLD
than take out an insufficient or unnecessary loan.
D. Effects of a Direct Subsidization System
The provisions of the FSRIA produce disparate economic results
among producers, because payments differ depending on producers'
level of production and profitability."'
Because a less profitable farmer is a greater credit risk, a private
financial intermediary will usually charge a higher interest rate than a
more profitable farmer would have charged. The higher interest rate
makes the loan even more difficult to pay back, with the result that a
greater proportion of a less profitable farmer's federal subsidy is
going to pay back loans than would be the case for a more profitable
farmer. In that sense, the federal subsidy is actually shifted from
farmers to financial intermediaries, who benefit from an essential
federal guarantee of at least a portion of the loan. Thus, a profitable
farmer who pockets all or most of his subsidy gains a much greater
utility from the subsidy than an unprofitable farmer who must use his
subsidy to repay the bank at a higher interest rate. In this way, a
federal subsidy can actually accelerate the demise of the very farmers
it is intended to protect.
The caps on payments are partially intended to address this
problem, by limiting the payment amount that large producers may
receive."' However, the cap assumes that larger farms are necessarily
more profitable farms, which may be untrue."3  It has also been
suggested that the caps disadvantage less profitable farmers, who lack
the sophistication and resources to avoid the caps by complex
restructuring methods, which more profitable producers routinely
engage in to reap greater subsidies."4  Since more profitable
111. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.2 (discussing DP variables and eligibility requirements);
supra Part I.C.3 (discussing CCP variables and eligibility requirements); supra Part I.C.4
(discussing LDP variables and eligibility requirements).
112. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1308 (capping payment of subsidies as a ceiling number based on
aggregate payments made; since payments are based on production, the caps primarily
affect those who produce the most). See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 102
(noting that larger producers who are affected by caps generally have lower production
costs, and "smaller, less efficient producers may expand production ... under further
payment limitations").
113. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 102 (admitting that lack of
information regarding "cost differences by farm size" prevented reaching any conclusions
on the effects of further limiting payment eligibility).
114. Congress has struggled mightily to close loopholes that allow producers to
restructure farms into multiple entities to avoid payments caps. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 1308-1 (containing measures regarding the "prevention of creation of entities to qualify
as separate persons; payments limited to active farmers"); id. § 1308-2 (preventing the use
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producers may be more adept at gaming the system, they receive a
disproportionate share of the benefits, again at the expense of less
profitable producers.
Different crops are subsidized at different levels; for example,
the higher relative target price for corn makes corn more lucrative
than wheat."15 For farmers with enough capital and sufficient growing
conditions to diversify crops, planting decisions can be tailored to
take full advantage of subsidies. For other farmers who lack the
capital needed to buy specialized equipment for different crops, being
caught with the "wrong" crop can spell disaster. The farmers who
lack the deep pockets and abundant land to make crop switches to
follow the programs are often the small family farms that the federal
government purports to protect. The risk that a particular
commodity will not be profitable is one every farmer assumes upon
entering the market, but by favoring certain crops with larger
subsidies, this risk is accentuated for farmers who lack the capital to
diversify crops or whose farm land is not versatile enough to plant
multiple types of crops.
Alternatives to production as a proxy for subsidization, such as
family ownership or farm size, would be difficult to enforce, may
foster counter-productivity and raise food prices, and may affect the
global competitiveness of American agricultural products. A
preferable alternative would identify and subsidize only those
segments of the agricultural sector that most require it. Because
producers by and large have equal access to markets to sell their
of "schemes and devices"-an undefined offense-to circumvent payment caps).
However, the difficulty of defining terms of ownership has thwarted most congressional
efforts to limit payments to single controlling entities. See, e.g., Brasher, supra note 60
(noting that although caps were nominally set at $150,000 [in 1999] a single landholding
company received $2 million, the King Ranch received more than $630,000, and overall,
two-thirds of the $27 billion in farm aid given in 2000 went to ten percent of producers).
New for 2004 is a limit on gross adjusted income, contained in 7 U.S.C.A. § 1308-3a, which
denies eligibility for subsidies to.any entity which has gross income in excess of $2,500,000,
"unless not less than 75 percent of the average adjusted gross income of the individual or
entity is derived from farming, ranching, or forestry operations." Id. at § 1308-3a(b)(1).
The efficacy of this limitation is dubious as well, since it is susceptible to the same
structuring methods currently employed by producers to avoid payment caps based on
production. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 101 (noting that farmers, in
concert with "business advisors, lawyers, and others, are likely to develop a range of
strategies to lessen the effects of further payments limitations").
115. Although the per bushel subsidy for corn is lower than that of wheat, the higher
yield of corn gives it a higher net subsidy. As noted earlier, the disparate levels of
subsidization for different subsidies may be the result of lobbying pressure brought to bear
by groups with an interest in seeing a particular crop subsidized more heavily. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the lobbying efforts of special interest groups).
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crops,"6 this Comment argues that the unfairness in the current
subsidy system stems primarily from disparate access to cheap capital,
not from a disparate price received for commodities. A system that
seeks to equalize producers by paying them all the same price for
their commodities, after the commodities have been produced, will
only exacerbate the inequality between producers because it
inherently rewards profitability instead of production. It is clear that
the current federal subsidization method is failing farmer and
taxpayer alike. 7 What is needed is equal access to cheap capital for
all producers, so that production can be entered into on equal footing.
The following section outlines a series of transactions, known as




Asset securitization is a financial transaction in which one entity,
an "originator," pools assets (typically income producing assets or
receivables) and transfers them by sale to another entity, a "special
purpose vehicle" ("SPV")."8  The SPV then issues securities
collateralized, or "backed," by the transferred assets."9 Public or
private investors evaluate the risk of the assets cloistered in the SPV
116. The exception to this, as noted earlier, is the possibility that profitable producers
may take advantage of market instruments such as futures contracts and options that less
profitable producers may be unable or unwilling to use, thus giving profitable producers a
greater utilization of market benefits. See supra Part I.C.3.b. However, this is a secondary
effect from the primary benefit of cheaper capital.
117. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-9 (outlining the rising federal costs
and rampant efforts to circumvent payment caps and recommending changes in payment
caps and producer eligibility); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, app. A at 132-
35 (noting the cost of the federal agricultural subsidies through 2002); Elizabeth Becker,
Land Rich in Subsidies, and Poor in Much Else, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at A14 (noting
that farmers reap little of the benefit of increased land values as a result of subsidies
because of liquidity issues).
118. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 2-14 (3d ed. 2002) (outlining the basic structure
of a securitization transaction); see also Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost
Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061-66 (1996) (same); Schwarcz, supra note 9,
at 131-34 (same).
119. For example, with securities based on assets with an income stream deriving from
accounts receivable for GM, the differing entities that owe money to GM (and now the
SPV) will be graded and analyzed for their respective risk. The securities issued will be
grouped according to projected risk, or alternatively, grouped so as to diversify risk.
Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 134-36.
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independent of the originator's financial or legal liabilities"a° and
decide whether to purchase securities based purely on the merits of
the assets backing them.121 When the securities are sold to investors,
the proceeds are used to pay the originator for the rights to the
assets. 122  The income stream derived from the assets themselves is
then used to pay investors a return on their investment.
123
Transactions resembling modern-day securitization first occurred
in the 1890s, when mortgage-backed bonds were sold to the public,
and mortgage bankers issued mortgage participation certificates
similar to modern mortgage-backed securities. 12 4 From the 1930s to
the 1980s, the securitization market consisted mostly of home
mortgages and other long-term loans.125  The recent growth in
securitizations was spurred in part by the federal government seeking
to lessen the cost of capital for homebuyers.126
The assets used in securitizations vary widely; essentially any
asset that currently is or will in the future produce income can be
securitized.1 27 Accounts receivables, the rights to royalties to David
Bowie songs, tobacco settlements, and the rights to production from
120. This financial concept is known as "bankruptcy remoteness." Several
commentators have questioned whether assets in an SPV are truly remote from the
originator's creditors. For interesting analyses of the topic see generally Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient
Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004); and
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1999).
121. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 136.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 140.
124. See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1380-82 (1991).
125. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance
Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
1261, 1263-65 (1991) (describing the secondary mortgage market growth and
securitization from the 1930s to the early 1980s).
126. Fixed-rate, level-payment mortgages were pooled into securities, backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States government, and sold to investors. See FRANK J.
FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 1-4 (1995); see also S.
Rep. No. 91-761, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3488, 3489 (enacting the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 in order to supplement "existing mortgage credit
facilities" and to foster "new secondary market facilities to broaden the availability of
mortgage credit"). For an example of more recent federal intervention see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1716 (1994) (stating that implementation of "secondary market facilities for residential
mortgages" will facilitate the resale market in mortgages).
127. The Comm. on Bankr. and Corp. Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BuS. LAW. 527, 541 [hereinafter
Bankr. Comm., Structured Financing Techniques].
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oil fields have all been securitized. 18 Usually, securities are based on
assets that are reasonably similar in type and level of risk, in order to
give investors a consistent pool of assets to evaluate. 129  However,
bundles of small assets can be pooled in an SPV in order to spread the
cost of securitization between originators, or large assets can be
allocated into several SPVs in order to make securities more
affordable or homogenous in risk. 130
A third party that has evaluated the risk may provide "credit
enhancement" for the assets transferred to an SPV by guaranteeing
the income stream generated by the assets.' Likewise, an SPV may
be "over-collateralized," meaning that extra income producing assets
are allocated to an SPV, providing a slight cushion of default before
the income stream is interrupted.132 Either method provides investors
with an extra level of risk protection, which may result in a premium
paid for asset-backed stock or a lower discount for asset-backed
debt.'33 The premium translates into a lower cost of capital for the
originator.'34
B. Advantages and Risks of Securitization
In an ideal securitization transaction, every party to the
transaction-originators, the entity controlling the SPV, and
investors-will benefit. One commentator has gone so far as to
characterize securitization as "alchemy" resulting in a cost reduction
for the originator and reduced risk for the investor.'35 However,
other commentators have questioned whether securitization of assets
creates "extra" value and have theorized that originators may actually
be harmed by the divestiture of the most valuable and liquid assets.
136
128. See Lisa M. Fairfax, When You Wish Upon a Star: Explaining the Cautious
Growth of Royalty-Backed Securitization, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 441, 459-61, 469-71
(1999) (noting the offering of bonds based on expected royalties from David Bowie
songs); Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Resource
Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 BUS. L. 885, 885-86, 894-97 (1997) (describing
the securitization of future revenues from the output of oil wells); Joni James & David
Milstead, States Mull Whether to Sell Stream of Tobacco Dollars, WALL ST. J., August 2,
2000, at S1, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3038697 (reporting the steps states had taken to
securitize tobacco settlements).
129. Bankr. Comm., Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 127, at 537.
130. Id.
131. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 136.
132. Id. at 136, 141.
133. Id. at 137.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 134.
136. See Panel Discussion, Remember When-Recollections of a Time When Aggressive
Accounting, Special Purpose Vehicles, Asset Light Companies and Executive Stock Options
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To an investor, securities based only on certain assets offer the
advantage of risk containment.137 Investors have less risk to analyze,
since they can focus solely on the risks involved with the income
stream underlying the assets; risks to the originator are severed from
the assets, if an effective sale has been made to the SPV. 138 This
containment of risk allows for efficient investment decisions, as well
as reduced risk of default on the assets. Third party guarantees of the
income stream or other risk-sharing mechanisms put in place by the
SPV can further lessen risk to the investor. 39 Investors can diversify
their investment by purchasing securitized assets from a number of
different global industries. 4 ' The risks associated with securitization
are not significantly different from those experienced in the everyday
stock market; if anything, the risks are lessened (and the price of the
securities higher) due to the customary level of risk insurance
employed by SPVs.141
To an entity controlling an SPV, securitization offers similar
benefits. Risk can be more easily identified and hedged against when
assets are segregated from the originator. 4 2 An SPV can purchase
assets from originators at a significant discount, especially if risky
income streams underpin the assets.143 Buying cheap assets with an
investor's money represents little direct risk to the SPV, which
functions as a clearinghouse and takes a margin on income stream
production. Furthermore, an SPV can purchase risk insurance from
third parties to cover the risk of income stream default, leaving the
SPV with little direct involvement in the securitization other than as a
Were Positive Attributes, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (2003) [hereinafter Panel
Discussion, AM. BANKR. INST.] (statement of William Brandt) (lamenting the uses to
which securitization had been put in order to defraud investors and bilk creditors); see also
LoPucki, supra note 120, at 23-30 (outlining some of the pitfalls for creditors when
securitization is used).
137. See TAMAR FRANKEL, 1 SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING,
FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 167-68 (1991).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 168.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 168-71. Risks typically associated with securities include risk of default
altogether, liquidity risk (that is, that payment due on the securities will not be in full or on
time), legal risk (risk that there will be legal liability incurred by the issuer of the
securities), and market risk (that the value of the securities will decline). Id.
142. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 138.
143. SPVs controlled by the originator are referred to as "one-off" SPVs; multi-
originator SPVs are referred to as "multi-seller securitization conduits." Id. at 138-40. In
this Comment, the entity controlling the SPV will be referred to as an SPV for ease of
reference; technically, the SPV is only a tool used by the entity and not a separate entity.
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structuring device.144 An originator can even form an SPV simply to
speed (or delay) realization of income for tax purposes, with no
expectation of profit from the sale of securities.
145
To an originator, the savings in net cost of capital enabled by
securitization can be significant.146 Because the assets involved often
include future income streams, an originator will frequently sell the
assets at a discounted price to reflect the current value and inherent
risk of the assets. 147 However, securitization differs from a simple sale
of the assets, such as "factoring," because the capital market provides
cheaper and more abundant capital than private lenders.'" Likewise,
investors are often willing to pay a premium for assets that are
segregated from the liabilities of the originators, since there is less
risk associated with the assets.149 This premium translates into more
net capital raised by selling the rights to assets or an income stream
than simply borrowing against them. 50 Assets will often remain in
the control of the originator, allowing the originator to use its
expertise in extracting the flow of income from the assets, as well as
any intangible benefit the originator may draw from having operating
control of the assets.' 5' If the credit enhancement premium paid by
investors is high enough, and the amount of assets securitized is large
enough to offset transaction costs, the originator can lower its net
capital cost. 52  The lower cost of capital can result in higher net
profitability, further enhancing the originator's credit.'53 For large,
closely scrutinized public companies, the balance sheet effects of
securitization can also be beneficial, as the company will show a
144. Id. at 143-44.
145. For example, a firm in a cyclical industry may wish to bring forward revenue in a
"down" year to offset loss, rather than pay increased taxes in the following year when
there may be excess profits. By selling the rights to income before the actual income is
realized, taxes can be paid sooner (or alternatively, delayed, if payment for the rights to
the income is delayed) to fit the corporation's prerogatives. For a fuller discussion of the
tax implications of securitization see SCHWARCZ, supra note 118, at 30-36.
146. See Hill, supra note 118, at 1007-94 (noting the effects of specialization, lower
information costs, and reduced agency costs enabled by securitization).
147. Id. at 1091-93.
148. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 144-45. Factoring is the sale of assets or an income
stream to a private party and usually involves a greater discount than securitization.
Factoring does not provide the same bankruptcy remoteness that securitization does
because an SPV to hold the segregated assets is not formed. Id.
149. Hill, supra note 118, at 1091-92.
150. Id. at 1092-94.
151. SCHWARCZ, supra note 118, at 20-23.
152. Hill, supra note 118, at 1103-04.
153. Id.
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higher return on equity and have more cash on hand.'54 Although the
accounting sleight of hand enabled by securitization has come under
increasing fire since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5' the
economic benefits of securitization are sufficient in their own right to
ensure that the practice will continue to grow.'56
Much has been written about the internal risks of securitization.
The innovations in securitization have outstripped common law
notions of property law and, to some extent, contract law.15 As a
result, questions have been raised about whether the assets in an SPV
are remote from a potential bankruptcy of the originator, and
whether sales to SPVs are in fact "true sales." '58 However, no serious
efforts have been mounted in courts to challenge the securitization
methodology, and legal risks seem to be limited to securitizations
which are clearly attempts to skirt the law.'59 Another commentator
has questioned the inherent efficiencies of securitization, implying
that the transaction costs of securitization outweigh any benefit
154. SCHWARCZ, supra note 118, at 23.
155. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201-66 (Supp. II 2000)). See also 36th Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation, SEC Summary, 1455 PRAC. L. INST. 75, 79-80 (Nov. 11-13, 2004)
(noting that previous accounting methods used to reverse the sale of loans and other assets
are obviated and modified by § 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and that new methods
require additional and more prominent disclosure); Stephen L. Schwarcz, Securitization
Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1549-50 (noting that § 401(c) and § 705 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC and the Comptroller General, respectively, to
examine the usage of transactions involving SPVs).
156. See Panel Discussion, AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 136, at 3-6 (noting that
despite the corporate scandals-in particular the deviously complex Enron schemes to
securitize fictional income sources-that have tainted sophisticated financial transactions
such as securitization, their use continues to grow); see also Schwarcz, supra note 155, at
1551-52 (stating that there are "fundamental differences" between legitimate
securitization and Enron, including rampant conflicts of interest in the Enron deals, as
well as the use of SPVs as a means of manipulating financial statements).
157. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1165 (1999) (arguing that by protecting fragmented property rights as in a securitization
the Supreme Court "paradoxically undermines the usefulness of private property as an
economic institution and constitutional category").
158. See Stephen Schwarcz, The Impact Of Bankruptcy Reform On "True Sale"
Determination in Securitization Transactions, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 353, 353-56
(2002) (noting that new bankruptcy laws may change the way securitizations are
structured, resulting in less protection of assets transferred to a SPV); see also Schwarcz,
supra note 155, at 1542-44 (examining the possibility of legislation that would allow judges
to redefine a sale as secured in certain instances, which would decrease an investor's
certainty that a securitization transaction would be treated as a sale in bankruptcy).
159. See Panel Discussion, AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 136, at 14 (statement of
Phillip Corwin) (noting that "[t]hough Enron gave a bad name to securitization, most are
a very legitimate way for companies to obtain low cost credit and remain liquid").
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conferred by cheaper capital. 16°  However, the prevalence and
increased regulation of securitization"I seem to discount any concerns
based on economic inefficiency.
162
C. Securitization of Agricultural Commodities
Commodity-backed securities to date primarily involve situations
where the income stream derives from the contractual obligations of a
single large originator. 163  This is in stark contrast to many
securitization transactions, where the underpinning income stream is
composed of multiple obligors.164  This makes the dearth of
securitization options for farmers all the more perplexing, since there
is no lack of demand for cheap capital. 65
However, there may be several reasons why multiple-originator
commodity-backed income streams are not prevalent in the United
States. The transaction costs of securitization are formidable, making
it inefficient for smaller originators to attempt them. 166 For many
small producers in the United States, the local bank may still offer
160. See Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitization, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 301, 301-07 (2002) (arguing that the increased transaction costs of banding
together originators and separating assets offset any benefit securitization may offer to
multiple originator SPVs).
161. The SEC has recently proposed several new rules to regulate asset-backed
securitization in particular. See Dow Jones Newswires, SEC Is Set to Tackle Asset-Backed
Paper, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2004, at A14.
162. See Schwarcz, supra note 158, at 363 n.48 (stating that "it would seem that for a
type of financing as important and widespread as securitization, those attempting to set
limits should bear the burden of producing persuasive empirical evidence that
securitization is inefficient").
163. See, e.g., Felipe Ossa, Colombian Dealmakers Bank on Market's Sweet Tooth, 3
ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Feb. 24, 2003, at 20 (noting the securitization of sugar by a
single large refinery), http://www.asreport.com/ (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
164. See, e.g., BANC ONE CAPITAL MARKETS, INC., STRUCrURED DEBT YEARBOOK
2004 24-33 [hereinafter BANC ONE YEARBOOK] (reviewing securitizations backed by
credit card receivables), http://www.securitization.net/pdf/bankone-yearbook_26Jan04.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); id. at 38-42 (same for manufactured
housing sales); id. at 65-67 (same for student loans).
165. See Agriculture Credit: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and
Forestry, 107th Cong. 74-75 (2001) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.AG 8/3:S.Hrg. 107-590) [hereinafter
107th Senate Hearing] (statement of Henry D. Edelman, C.E.O. Farmer Mac) (stating that
"as risk has increased, a number of lenders have become increasingly capital constrained
and have tightened underwriting requirements that make it difficult or impossible for
some farmers who urgently need credit to obtain it with competitive rates and terms"),
available at http://agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/Hearings_2001/May_16_2001/
0516ede.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
166. See FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 121-22 (noting that pooling can increase debt
and costs if an increased number of originators is not offset by economies of scale).
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cheaper capital than would be available through a private
securitization. 167
Another difficulty lies in the actual structuring of a multiple-
originator agricultural commodity securitization. Much of the
structuring will involve original work by lawyers and financiers, which
is expensive and risky. It may be that firms that underwrite
securitizations generally prefer to use market-tested methods and
principles that ensure a reassuringly boring (and lucrative) securities
offering, such as one based on credit card receivables. Additionally,
finding third party guarantors may be difficult because assessing and
allocating risk can be notoriously difficult in the commodities market,
where producers are subject to both significant price risk and
catastrophic weather risk.168 Although futures, options, and other
derivatives offer a hedge against these risks, firms may be reluctant to
structure an entity without a solid market precedent. Consequently,
because of the inherent risk in commodities production, and because
of the relatively uncharted territory, commodity securitizations have
remained a largely untapped source of capital for producers.
The barriers to such a securitization are not insurmountable.
The current market conditions in the agricultural industry are not
unlike those in the mortgage industry in the late 1970s, when the
federal government stepped in and sponsored securitizations of home
mortgages in order to provide new capital markets for homebuyers. 69
A similar intervention in the agricultural industry is warranted,
especially given that the federal government has a direct interest in
ensuring that producers have access to cheap, timely capital. The
following discussion outlines some of the issues unique to an
agricultural commodities securitization.
D. Agricultural Commodities Securitization Model
Despite the scarcity of multi-source commodity securitizations,
valuable instruction can be drawn from examples of securitization of
similar income producing assets (such as oil production receivables
generated by oil wells). The following discussion introduces some of
the basic concepts involved with commodity securitization.
167. Cheap, but not cheap enough. See 107th Senate Hearing, supra note 165 (noting
that despite efforts by the federal government to offer favorable loans to farmers, many
still were not able to receive enough money at favorable rates to stay competitive).
168. See infra Parts II.D.2.a-b.
169. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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1. Interests on Which a Commodities Securitization May Be Based
a. Production Payments
"A production payment constitutes a right either to a specified
share of the production from [a given plot of land] (a volumetric
production payment) or to the proceeds from the sale of that
production (a monetary production payment).""17 If the production
payment is used to support a securitization, the right to payment is
sold by the producer to an SPV.171 The rights to the production
payment are purchased from the originator by the SPV with funds
obtained from equity or debt investors accessed in a capital markets
transaction.172 Once the rights to the production payment have been
transferred to the SPV, the producer no longer has rights to the
proceeds of the transferred interest.'73 The security holders look
exclusively to proceeds from production for payment of a return on
investment, with no recourse to the producer.
174
b. Forward Sale and Purchase of Commodities
A forward sale occurs when a commodity owner (or lessee of
commodity rights) agrees to sell certain commodities at a given point
in the future at a given price to an SPV in exchange for an immediate
cash advance. 75 The SPV will then issue securities based on the
rights to purchase the commodities at a given price.176 For an
investor, purchase of this security is essentially no different from
buying the futures contract themselves on a commodity exchange,177
except for the diversification an SPV offers. 78 Third party guarantees
of securities backed by forward contracts can bolster risk coverage in
170. See Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 893 (noting the structure of future flow oil
securitizations and cataloguing the risks).
171. Id.
172. Id. The funds necessary to purchase the assets from the originator could also be





177. Several commodity exchanges in the United States offer contracts in single types
of commodities in varying denominations and amounts. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade,
at http://www.cbot.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) (discussing the fact that most
agricultural commodities, such as grains, livestock, and agricultural inputs like fertilizer,
are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
178. For instance, while an investor could purchase the right to delivery of a 5000
bushel soybean contract, such a contract would not offer the same risk mitigation that a
security based on five million bushels deriving from several different producers would.
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order to maximize value to investors.1 79
c. Receivables Generated from Sales of Commodities
Producers generate receivables when they sell commodities, 8 ' as
do grain elevators and other intermediaries. 81 Whether arising from
"cash" sales or sales under forward contracts, receivables constitute
the asset that most frequently underlies commodity securitizations.
18 2
However, as noted before, multiple-originator securitizations of this
type have been limited in size and success.183
2. Commodities Securitization Risks
Securitizations of commodities present a number of risks. It is
crucial that these risks be identified and minimized in order to receive
a favorable credit rating. Without a favorable rating, investors will
steer clear of the offering, and any hope an originator has of raising
cheap capital will evaporate. 1 4  Credit ratings are assigned to
securities by rating agencies, which evaluate securities at the request
of the issuer."8 "The ratings represent the agency's opinion as to the
credit risk associated with a security and the likelihood that the
security will be repaid timely."'8s6  Following are some of the risks
analysts consider when rating securities based on future income
streams, the securitization type that this Comment recommends the
federal government sponsor.
a. Production Risks
The value of future income from production depends partially on
the quantity of the commodities being produced. In the context of
agricultural production, a primary risk associated with production is
weather.1 87 The federal government recognizes and attempts to
179. Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 888-89.
180. See id. at 897.
181. A grain elevator is an entity that purchases and stores commodities. The elevator
may be owned by the end user of the commodity, or it may be a third party that purchases
from producers and sells to end users. See Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544, 547
(7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that contracts between farmers and grain elevators "guarantee
farmers a buyer for their grain and guarantee grain elevators a supply of a commodity").
182. See id.
183. See supra Part II.C.
184. See Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 900.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., INTRODUCTION TO
RISK MANAGEMENT 6 (Dec. 1997). The USDA lists pests, disease, the interaction of
technology with other farm and management characteristics, genetics, machinery
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address this risk by repeated passage of "emergency" bills to give
relief to farmers stricken by weather disasters, such as a drought or
hurricane.18 1 Weather disasters can be localized, such as a hailstorm
or lightning-induced fire, or they can be more widespread, such as a
drought or a hurricane. Although meteorological technology has
grown apace with general agricultural advances, it is still difficult to
anticipate with any local particularity the weather risks of an entire
growing season. The critical determination for an investor is what
level of production risk is acceptable in an investment." 9
Additional production risks unique to agricultural commodities
are also difficult to analyze and quantify.19 ° Predicting how and where
disease or insect depravation will occur remains problematic, at least
on a localized basis. Other industries that have securitized
commodities, such as oil production, have developed sophisticated
risk analysis tools that incorporate several individualized factors, 9'
but the essential difference remains that reserve risk of an
underground oil deposit can be calculated much more accurately than
production risk to a corn crop that is subject to the vagaries of
weather and disease. Hence, an agricultural commodity securitization
will require a substantial level of risk guarantee to be attractive to
investors.
b. Price Risks
The level of price risk that ratings agencies (and investors) must
assess depends on the nature of the assets acquired by the SPV. If the
efficiency, and the quality of inputs as other "major" production risks. Id. The USDA has
an extensive weather analysis website designed to measure and quantify risk. U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., JOINT AGRICULTURAL WEATHER FACILITY, at http://www.usda.gov/
agency/oce/waob/jawf (Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
188. In 1999 through 2000, Congress provided five emergency aid bills that added $29.6
billion to existing funding for agriculture, partly in response to weather disasters which
affected yields. See Jean Yavis Jones et al., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: WHAT IS A FARM BILL? 11-12 (May 5, 2001) [hereinafter CRS
REPORT], http://bennelson.senate.gov/Crs/farmbill.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Disaster aid is not solely to farmers, of course, but as farmers stand to lose
not only personal possessions but means of livelihood as well, a substantial amount of
weather related disaster relief assistance is directed at farmers.
189. See Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 899-900 (noting that production risk "must be
addressed in a manner acceptable to the originator and a rating agency if the related
securities will be rated.").
190. For example, in each of the past several years, one-half to two-thirds of counties in
the United States have been declared agricultural disaster areas. FARM SERV. AGENCY,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CROP DISEASE ASSISTANCE, at http://disaster.usda.gov/
crop_.jump.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
191. See Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 898-903.
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commodity production acquired by the SPV is to be sold on the open,
or "spot," market rather than under long-term forward contracts, the
future market for such production must be evaluated.192 Just as price
drops can skew the projected cost of subsidies programs, unexpected
price drops can significantly affect the economics of a commodities
securitization. A securitization based on a volumetric or cash price
forward contract requires that investors (and any guarantor) assume a
commercial risk.193 For example, a security based on the production
of an acre of land is subject to the risk that the price for the
commodity produced on that land will go down. If the risk can be
foreseen or anticipated, the price of the security will be discounted to
reflect such a risk. 94 However, given the nature of the commodity
market, many investors may also wish to employ a hedge; that is,
purchasing or selling financial instruments that further diminish
risk.195 A variety of hedges are available on the commodities market,
usually in the form of options. 196 As an alternative or in addition to a
hedge, a rating agency may utilize a worst-case price assumption in
valuing the assets and discount the securities to provide a "cushion"
to investors.1 97 The price of the security will reflect both the level of
risk and the cost of hedging against it, and if the price risk is too great,
the resulting low price of the security will not justify the
securitization.'98 As the amount of transactions increase (and hence
the cost of the securitization), the likelihood that it will be cheaper for
the originator simply to borrow funds from the private market also
increases. 199
c. Operator/Management Risks
Producers who generate the future commodity receivables
acquired by the SPV must have sufficient financial and technical
expertise to manage the assets.2°° Analysis of the commodity-backed
securities proposed in this Comment will have to take into account
the wide range in management and profitability of American farms.




196. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (explaining how options may be
used to employ hedges in the commodity market).
197. Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 901.
198. See FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 160-62 (noting that there is a threshold cost of
securitization beyond which private capital may be cheaper for the originator).
199. Id.
200. Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 900-02.
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A wealth of county, state, and national data has been compiled by the
federal government in the administration of the subsidization
program, and this information could be used to analyze yield data,




The political risks of a commodity securitization in the United
States are partially hidden but very real. While in developing
countries the risks of expropriation or regime change wilt the ardor of
investors, in the United States the risks center around policy shifts
and administration philosophy. While these "soft" risks may not grab
headlines in the same manner as bombs falling on Baghdad, they have
an effect on agricultural production and industry direction.
The wavering policy goals of subsidization in the United States
offer a good example of what political risks a private agricultural
securitization may face.2° Programs to take land out of production or
subsidies based solely on land ownership may be disincentives to
production,2 3 which could affect the attractiveness of volumetric or
other production-based securities. On the other hand, the crop
insurance that the federal government provides to producers204 may
offer an extra level of safety for investment in production, a sort of
free hedge against disaster. In either event, any agricultural
securitization requires careful analysis of the industry as a whole, as
well as examination of individual originators.
The external legal risks of a commodities securitization are the
legal risks unique to the particular industry from which the
commodity is derived. The laws and regulations, particularly
environmental legislation to which farms are subject can provide
disincentives for production.2 5  Zoning laws have become
201. See FEDSTATS, STATISTICAL AGENCIES, at http://www.fedstats.gov/key-stats/
ERSkey.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) [hereinafter FEDSTATS] (noting the various types
of financial information on farmers kept on file by the federal government, including farm
structure, income and performance) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
202. See supra Part I.B (examining the history of the federal subsidization of
agriculture in the United States).
203. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting the inclusion of conservation
and crop insurance titles in FSRIA).
204. See id.
205. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26
(1994) (regulating the usage and distribution of water). See also 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994) (regulating the usage and distribution of herbicides and pesticides); 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1994) (regulating land use, particularly wetlands, under the auspices of the
Endangered Species Act); 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-3836 (1994) (containing the provisions of the
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increasingly relevant to farmers with the accelerating urban
encroachment on agricultural land and can have a significant impact
on the type and size of agricultural operations permitted. °6
III. FEDERAL SECURITIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
The federal government has found that maintaining an
agricultural subsidization system is increasingly difficult due to the
inherent inefficiency of direct subsidies .20  Because the federal
government will be subsidizing American agriculture for the
foreseeable future, it should strive to support agriculture in the most
efficient and effective manner possible.
The disincentives to securitization present for private parties also
exist for the federal government, but to a lesser degree, due to the
investment the federal government already has in agriculture. The
potentially high cost of banding together multiple-originators has
already been offset by the gathering effect of the subsidy programs.2 8
The weather, disease, and operator risks present in a securitization
are already undertaken by the federal government, in effect, by the
current subsidy program. Existing farm agencies already work closely
with producers and, because they are deeply familiar with the policy
and procedures of a subsidy program, would be well qualified to
implement and administer a securitization subsidy regime once it is
structured.209
Most compellingly for the federal government, the increased
efficiency of a securitization may lower the costs of subsidization,
Conservation Reserve Program, designed to take land out of production).
206. For an overview of the difficulties farmers face from municipal zoning ordinances,
see generally Patrick J. Skelley II, Note, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural
Communities, Leap-Frog Development, and Reverse Exclusionary Zoning, 16 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 273 (1997).
207. See supra Part I.D (noting that under the current system, payment limits are
bypassed by structuring a single farm as multiple entities, as in a cooperative, thus giving a
disproportionate share of subsidies to entities sophisticated enough to manipulate the
system); see also Brasher, supra note 60 (noting that giant farms bypass federal payment
limits to the detriment of smaller farmers).
208. Eligibility requirements ensure that the federal government has information on all
farms currently receiving subsidies. See supra Part I.C.; see also FEDSTATS, supra note
201. Pooling assets into an SPV is essentially the transfer of information and obligations.
FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 287-95. It is a relatively small step for the federal
government to shift its obligations from single farmers to farmers within the SPV.
209. Since the essential function of facilitating and administering federally sponsored
payments to farmers would remain largely the same, the FSA would likely have little
difficulty shifting from a direct payment system to one utilizing securitization. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text (describing the functions of the FSA).
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market prices being equal.20 The following proposal outlines the
actions the federal government can take to make federal
securitization of agricultural commodities a reality.
A. Federal Securitization Model
1. Transaction Structure
Initially, the federal government will have to provide the impetus
to securitize agricultural commodities from multiple originators.2 u
This can be accomplished primarily by the creation of a federally
sponsored SPV. The SPV will gather together the multiple producers
of commodities who will provide the income stream on which the
securitization will be based.21 2 Producers will sell the rights to the
production of a given amount of land in a given commodity to the
SPV; for instance, rights to the production of an acre of corn. The
income stream from these units of land will be structured into
securities, which can be sold to investors. In order to move payment
forward to the farmers, securities based on revenue received at
harvest should be issued early in the growing season.2 13
The investor will then be paid at harvest time out of the proceeds
from the sale of the commodities. Although harvest and time of sale
will depend on the type of commodity, the length of the investment
will be roughly consonant with the growing season: six to nine
months, depending on the crop.214 As the commodity is harvested
210. Should payments be equal to current direct subsidies, the federal government will
still benefit from the delayed payment enabled by a securitization. If the securities reach
their floor price without governmental assistance, then the federal government has no cost
other than that associated with structuring the SPV. See infra Part III.A.l.b. In the
current direct subsidy system, the DP is made regardless of market prices, ensuring some
level of governmental liability. See supra Part I.C.2.
211. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting a similar invigoration of the
secondary market in home mortgages).
212. Thomas J. Gordon, Comment, Securitization of Executory Future Flows as
Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2000) (stating that SPVs
can base the issuance of securities on expected future flows of income).
213. For instance, for corn harvested in October, securities need to be issued in the
spring to offset the planting and operating expenses of the producers.
214. For corn, the growing season in the United States is roughly from April-May to
September-October. See NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
USUAL PLANTING AND HARVEST DATES FOR U.S. FIELD CROPS (Dec. 1997),
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/field/planting/uph97.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). For soybeans, the growing season depends on the variety
and ranges from six to nine months in length. Id. For wheat, the growing season also
depends on variety and ranges from seven to ten months. Id. The federal SPV will have
to take the growing season variance into account when determining time of payment to
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and marketed, payment will be made to the federal SPV on the
portion under obligation. The SPV will then allocate the agreed level
of payment to investors. In this manner, the producer is essentially
paid for a significant portion of its crop at or before the point of
planting, providing the producer with sufficient capital to operate.215
The investor is guaranteed a favorable level of return on a reasonably
short-term investment.216 The federal government has no financial
obligation at the point of planting and, with favorable market prices,
none at all beyond the cost of structuring the securitization.
a. Originator Analysis: Production and Price Risk
The yield history of the farms required to calculate base acres
under the current subsidy system217 can be used as a proxy to
determine the range in which future production will fall. This range
of production can be estimated with reasonable particularity on a
large scale, as evidenced by the close estimates regarding acres
planted and national yield produced by the federal government.1 8
This large-scale accuracy offsets the individual difficulty that has to
this point deterred private securitizations.219 Once an estimate of
total production has been made, the federal government can calculate
what level of commodity production (the volumetric estimate) is
eligible for securitization.22 °
Price risk will be more difficult to assess, as the federal
producers and investors.
215. See Gordon, supra note 212, at 1320-21 (noting that in a future income stream
securitization, the originator is paid for the "sale" of assets before the assets generate
income).
216. Id. at 1342-43.
217. See supra Part I.C.2 (outlining the calculation and usage of yield history data in
determining DP eligibility).
218. The federal government routinely makes agricultural production estimates, often
for as far as ten years into the future. See INTERAGENCY AGRIC. PROJECTIONS COMM.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE BASELINE PROJECTIONS TO 2013 24-27 (2004)
(noting the expected planted acres of corn soybeans and wheat until 2013),
http://www.usda.gov/oce/waob/commodity-projections/2013projections.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
219. This spreading of risk over a larger pool is a major advantage of securitization.
See supra Part II.B. In the context of commodity production, having multiple originators
may allow for shortfalls in certain geographical areas, whether caused by weather, disease,
or operator failure, to be made up for by increased production in other areas due to the
same variables.
220. For example, if the government will guarantee seventy-five of projected planted
corn acres at seventy-five percent historic average yield, then a projected planting of 1000
acres of corn with a historic yield of 120 bushels to the acre will be eligible to securitize the
production of 750 acres yielding ninety bushels; 67,500 bushels.
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government has found in past attempts to set target prices. 221
However, the information needed to analyze the potential market
price for a commodity is already available to the federal government,
and securitization will allow the analysis to be conducted on a rolling
basis, as securities are issued.222 By calculating a price at which to
guarantee the income stream more often than is currently done in the
subsidy program, a more accurate analysis can be made, since new
information can be added to pricing models more frequently.223
Because of the greater volume of bushels being covered and the
earlier payment to producers enabled by securitization, the payment
per bushel in a securitization may not need to be as high as the target
price is in the current subsidy program. 24
b. Security Structure
Once production and price risk have been analyzed and
estimated, the government can begin to structure the securities to be
issued.
Perhaps the simplest and most effective structure would be to sell
the rights to a given amount of production from a given plot of land, a
volumetric production payment.2 25 Because the existing information
and infrastructure regarding commodity production in the United
States is measured in production per acre, the basic unit on which a
security could be based is the right to the commodity production of an
acre of land for one growing season.2 6 These rights may be pooled
into a federally sponsored and administered SPV and repackaged and
sold to investors as securities.
221. See supra Part I.B (noting the over-runs of the federal subsidy programs,
attributable in part to governmental liability incurred when market prices fell below target
prices).
222. See supra Part I.C (noting the information required of farmers in order to receive
subsidies); see also FEDSTATS, supra note 201 (providing information on American farms
ranging from demographic to financial).
223. It is also reasonable to expect that private market analysis of the commodity
market will increase as the securities become available on the market and investor interest
is generated. As increasing information is sought out and made available, it is possible
that prices may be predicted more accurately. For an analysis of the interplay between
market prices and farm conditions, see generally Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The
Nature of the Farm, 41 J.L. & ECON. 343 (1998).
224. For instance, if the target price for corn is dropped from its current level of $2.60
to $2.00, the producer in the prior example will still be eligible for a payment of $135,000
at the beginning of the crop season, as opposed to a payment six months after harvest that
may be subject to caps.
225. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
226. For example, the right to the proceeds of corn production from an acre of land for
the growing season of 2005.
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Securities that incorporate some aspects of both volumetric
production and fixed payment will be attractive to investors only if
there is a level of guarantee of both production and price risk. 27 For
example, a security based on the production of a given amount of
land planted in corn bears both the risk that the corn will not be
produced, and the risk that the price upon which the value of the
security is based will decline.228 To offset the uncertainty inherent to
income stream estimates, the federal government may provide a level
of assurance to the investor by guaranteeing payment at a certain
level.229
A "floor" price can be established based on the estimated
minimum value of the income stream, and the government will
guarantee that this price will be paid for commodities regardless of
the market price of the commodities when sold. If the government
wants a higher price paid for the securities (and hence more capital to
producers), it can raise the floor of the security to the desired level.
Of course, by raising the floor, the government assumes more risk in
the event that production falters or price drops. This risk could be
passed on to private insurers for a fixed fee paid at the time of the
securitization, or the government can bear the risk itself.
23 °
Leaving marketing in the hands of the producers allows the
marketing to be done by the party best suited to sell the commodity,
since the producer would be able to dispose of the commodities more
efficiently than would the federal government. 23 1  The producers
already have infrastructure in place to store and market
227. See Harrell et al., supra note 128, at 888-89 (noting that commodity-backed
securitizations usually require some sort of third party guarantee due to their inherent
risk).
228. See supra Parts II.D.2.a-b (explaining production and price risk in commodity
securitization).
229. See FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 359-401 (listing the types of third party
guarantees typically employed in securitizations, such as an independent party agreeing-
for a fee-to insure that the income stream from a particular pool of asset will maintain a
certain level).
230. The fact that the government already bears similar risk in the CCP and LDP
programs suggests that it will wish to bear the risk itself in order to minimize expense to
itself at planting, even if risk of future payment is higher. See supra Parts I.C.3-4
(outlining provisions of the CCP and LDP portions of the subsidy program).
231. See TAMAR FRANKEL, 2 SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING,
FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 91-97 (1991) (noting that
when the originator is the servicer of the pool, this may create efficiencies that cannot be
duplicated by hiring an outside source to oversee the management of the income streams);
see also Gordon, supra note 212, at 1335 (stating that "riut is more efficient for the SPV to
hire the originator as its collection and administration agent than to collect and administer
the accounts by itself").
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commodities-storage facilities, transportation equipment, and
personal contacts-that the federal government would have to
duplicate if the commodities were purchased outright from the
producer at harvest. Simply buying the rights to the commodities
allows the physical growing, marketing, and delivering of the
commodities to be handled by the producer.232
A potential problem with selling income rights to the federal
SPV is that doing so lessens the producer's incentive to sell the
commodity for the highest possible price. This hurts the federal
government, which must make up any shortfall between the floor
price and the price received on the market. However, if the amount
received at the point of sale exceeds the floor price, in a traditional
securitization, the investor would benefit from any appreciation in the
security due to higher production or price. The difficulty with
allowing the investor to reap the entire benefit is that it destroys the
producer's primary incentive to market the commodity profitably:
the producer has already received its payment and will be
economically indifferent to the price paid at market.
In order to provide the producer with an incentive to seek the
highest possible price for the commodity-that is, to maintain the
efficiency of the market-a "ceiling" should be placed on the
commodity-backed security as well. This ceiling would be the
maximum amount an investor would be entitled to receive under the
security agreement. Determining the ceiling would be a policy
consideration similar to that involved with setting the floor price.233
Revenues received beyond the ceiling price would be absorbed by the
federal SPV, which would then distribute the excess revenues to
producers as a bonus. By rewarding effective production and
marketing in this way, the efficiency of the market could be
preserved.
For instance, consider a security based on the production of one
acre planted in corn, with a floor price of $2.70 per bushel and floor
production of 120 bushels. Such a security would have a face value of
$324.00 at the time of its issuance.234 Should the price of corn increase
232. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting that allowing the assets to
remain under the control of the originator may reap the benefits of the originator's
expertise in managing them).
233. However, instead of choosing a static floor and ceiling price at the inception of a
farm bill that lasts for the duration of the bill, the market and production indicators would
be analyzed yearly, and the floor and ceiling prices for each production year would be
adjusted according to the goals of the federal government.
234. Like all securities based on a payment to be made in the future, the value of the
security would likely be discounted at issuance to reflect the time value of money. The
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to $3.00 per bushel, and production rise to 150 bushels, the security
would be worth $450.00, an increase of $126.00 from the floor price.
If the ceiling price were $2.85 and the ceiling yield were 140, the
investor would be entitled to $399.00, and the federal SPV would
retain $51.00. The surplus above the ceiling value would then be
returned to the producer at whatever bonus ratio the federal
government establishes.
Should the price of corn drop to $2.50 per bushel, and yields only
reach 100 bushels nationally, the securities would be worth $250.00, a
decline in value of $74.00 below the floor value. The federal
government would be obligated to cover this shortfall to investors.
The producer would have already received a payment of $324.00 per
acre at the time of issuance and would be the benefactor of an
effective subsidy of $74.00 per acre, softening the blow of lower prices
-and yield.
2. Benefits and Risks to Originator/Producer
For producers, the primary benefit is precisely that not offered
by the current subsidization structure: access to cheap capital, when
needed. By moving payment for the crops forward to when the
producers are incurring costs, rather than paying the bulk of the
subsidy post-harvest, borrowing costs for the producer are lessened
and perhaps eliminated.
By subsidizing access to capital rather than land ownership and
raw production, the playing field would be leveled for producers.
Although the gross subsidy will still be larger for higher production,
less profitable producers would no longer have to borrow at a higher
interest rate to make ends meet.235 Subsidization of producers would
be more of a voluntary choice for those who wish to make an
investment, rather than the current system of involuntary
subsidization by all taxpayers.236
By aggregating the commodities in the SPV, credit is extended to
producers as a whole by investors. The effect of such a structure
amount of the discount would depend on several factors, including the prevailing interest
rate and the risk inherent to the security.
235. See supra Part I.D.
236. Of course, whatever level of federal participation remained in a securitization
structure-that of structuring and administrating the SPV, and providing some level of
guarantees-would be at the cost of taxpayers at large. At its inception, securitization
would lessen, not eliminate the tax burden, although in the long-term, private
securitization may begin to obviate the need for federal participation, similar to the home
mortgage market (which still has a significant level of federal participation). See supra
notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing the home mortgage market).
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would be that high profitability operations would subsidize lower
profitability ones, by giving them the benefit of a higher aggregate
credit rating.237 Shifting part of the cost of the subsidy from the
federal government to profitable producers may eventually result in
the more profitable producers leaving if cheaper capital becomes
available, perhaps through private securitizations. However, this
would be a positive effect for the federal government, whose net costs
would be lowered because less of the crop would need to be
guaranteed. The remaining producers who would be subsidized
would be those who need, and arguably deserve, the subsidies most.
The gradual winnowing effect of encouraging profitable producers to
seek cheaper capital while at the same time supporting struggling
producers is a characteristic of securitization that cannot be matched
by direct subsidies. By subsidizing a farmer's access to capital rather
than his production, the problem of high borrowing costs is addressed
at its root rather than its result.
Securitization could also lessen the impact of disasters on
farming operations, because there would be capital on hand to deal
with the disasters. Unlike current emergency provisions, which can
take years to give aid, farmers would have more capital on hand to
rebuild or replant after a disaster. 38
Farmers would also have the ability to borrow more from local
banks to meet costs, whether normal or catastrophic, because their
effective credit ceiling would be higher. The federal guarantee of
income to farmers would enhance their overall profitability and make
them more attractive to lenders. Mitigating the cash flow problems
inherent to a cyclical industry would enhance the overall equity value
of farms, permitting farmers to borrow the large amounts necessary to
purchase land and equipment.
Securitization potentially lowers the cost of marketing for the
farmer. By allowing the bulk of the crop to be sold prior to or in
conjunction with planting, without the price risk associated with
futures contracts, farmers could avoid many of the transaction costs
associated with taking their goods to the market. Any subsequent
gain in the market price would be returned to the farmer pursuant to
ceiling caps.
Because farmers receive reciprocal SPV payments if the price of
237. See FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 167-68 (noting that investors also benefit from
diversified originators and pools).
238. See supra Parts I.C.2-4 (outlining the timing of payment under current direct
subsidies); see also CRS REPORT, supra note 188 (noting the various emergency bills
enacted in the past decade).
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the security exceeds the ceiling, they have a strong incentive to
produce and market effectively. Farmers are in an ideal position
because the federally sponsored SPV assumes the obligation to pay
investors if production or prices falter, and if the security increases in
value past the ceiling, then farmers will receive a percentage of the
excess.
3. Benefits and Risks to SPV/ Federal Government
The most compelling benefit to the federal government of
securitization is the savings it will enable. By shifting the cost of
capital to the public markets, the government will potentially limit its
costs to those associated with structuring and maintaining the SPV.239
If market prices and production stay at favorable levels, then the
federal government will not be required to step in as a guarantor, and
the money usually carved out of tax revenue will simply be paid from
investor to producer. This would benefit the federal government
tremendously, since the transactions associated with taxing and
distributing capital are replaced by the more efficient distribution of
capital enabled by the private financial market.24°
If the government is compelled by low prices or production to
honor its guarantee, deferring payment until after harvest allows
payment to investors to be delayed until additional tax revenues are
also realized.241 The burden of deferment is borne by investors who
do not have the immediate capital requirements of farmers. Even if
the net payment made by the government in a securitization
approaches that made in a direct subsidy, it will still reap the benefit
of deferment. In effect, because a security is purchased by an investor
at the beginning of the growing season, and payment is not due until
harvest, the government receives a low interest loan from investors, at
a rate more favorable than if the government had to borrow to fulfill
its obligations under the current subsidy system.
Shifting the burden of raising capital for subsidization programs
to the private market could have far-reaching effects. Foreign
investors are already enamored with the security and stability of
239. FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 360-63 (noting that guarantors have no liability
unless the conditions of the guarantee are not met).
240. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 149-50 (noting the relative low cost of financing capital
markets).
241. FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 360-63 (noting that guarantors have no liability until
there is an interruption in the underpinning income stream, or some other conditions of
the guarantee are not met).
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United States markets24 2 and would likely view American agriculture
as a similarly attractive proposition.2 43  Transferring production and
price risk to foreign interests while retaining the safety and security of
a key component of the American economy should be an enticing
prospect for the federal government.
The costs of implementing a securitization are partially offset by
existing features of the subsidy system. The information needed to
structure the income stream is already largely available to the federal
government, because the type of information gathered to determine
eligibility under the FSRIA is the same information needed to
analyze the risks associated with an agricultural securitization:
historic yield, rate of default, median farm income, along with a host
of more individualized factors.2"
4. Benefits to Investors
The benefits to investors of a federally backed commodity
securitization would include all the benefits normally associated with
securitization: diversification, mitigation of risk, increased access to
relevant information, and relative ease of investment.245
In addition, commodity backed securities represent an
opportunity to support a cause that is consistently popular with
voters: the American "family farm." '246 To the extent that socially
242. Foreign investment in the United States is at record levels. As of the last survey
conducted by the United States Treasury, foreign investment in long-term securities
exceeded $2.8 trillion. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SUMMARY OF REPORT ON
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF DEC. 31, 1997 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.treas.gov/tic/shl94sum.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
243. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RESEARCH EMPHASIS-A
COMPETITIVE AGRICULTURE SYSTEM: OVERVIEW, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Emphases/Competitive/overview.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
COMPETITIVE AGRICULTURE] (stating that the United States' share of the global
agriculture market is just under twenty percent and agriculture has a high rate of
productivity) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
244. See supra Part .C (noting the information required of farmers in order to receive
subsidies); see also FEDSTATS, supra note 201 (providing information on American farms,
ranging from demographic to financial).
245. See supra Part II.B (outlining the benefits and risks of securitization). Having a
single originator greatly increases the entity risk of a securitization, suggesting that
multiple originator securitizations backed by a third party guarantee, such as the one
urged in this Comment, are inherently less risky because they spread risk of default over a
number of entities.
246. See AM. FARMLAND TRUST, PROTECTING OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCES:
THE RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 4 (2001) (citing a public opinion
poll showing that eighty-one percent of respondents wish to buy food from an American
farm and eighty percent know of and support federal subsidy programs that benefit
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responsible investing is a concern for investors, giving struggling
farmers a fair shake may be attractive.
The fact that the securities will be backed by the United States
government could lend the investments an extra level of protection,
similar to United States treasury bonds.247  The increased investor
confidence based on this implied "rating" could translate into a
higher price for the securities.2 48  Likewise, political and economic
stability in the United States could make the securities attractive to
investors, as would the relative ascendancy of American
agriculture.249
The federal government could also add an extra level of benefit
to investors by allowing favorable tax treatment of commodity
backed securities, similar to municipal bonds.250  By foregoing tax
revenue on commodity backed securities, the securities would have
more intrinsic value to investors, and the federal government could
lessen its obligation to subsidize, since more capital would be drawn
from the private market.
B. Alternative Models
Sponsoring an SPV is not the only way the federal government
could make a foray into securitization; the federal government could
opt to act as a guarantor for a private SPV.
2 5a
This lesser commitment could give the federal government time
to set up its own SPV and allow it to take advantage of the expertise
and experience of private financial intermediaries. It could also allow
for smaller scale securitizations, such as on a crop-by-crop basis, until
the creation of an overarching federal SPV. However, because the
"family farms"), http://www.aftresearch.org/farmbill/docs/report-l.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
247. United States Treasury bonds typically trade at a premium, i.e., have a lower rate
of return, because investors view the guarantee that the United States government will not
default on its bonds to be more trustworthy than that of other offerings. See BUREAU OF
THE PUBLIC DEBT, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT TREASURY BILLS, NOTES,
AND BONDS, at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/sec/secfaq.htm#secfaql (last updated Jan.
3, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
248. See FRANKEL, supra note 137, at 396-99 (noting the effects of a favorable rating
for securities).
249. See COMPETITIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 243 (stating that the United States
has roughly twenty percent of the world agricultural market share).
250. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (West 2004) (noting the special tax-exempt status of municipal
bonds).
251. See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text (noting that the secondary market
in home mortgages was statutorily backed by the "full faith and credit" of the United
States government).
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federal government already has access to the information needed to
analyze the risks of a securitization 252 and already controls a system of
distribution of subsidies,253 it may be more efficient to shift the
manner of distribution internally, rather than transferring information
and authority to a private financial intermediary. However, the
federal government will almost certainly be obliged to solicit private
consulting, and perhaps it would be cheaper to turn over
administration of the SPV entirely.
CONCLUSION
If the floor price of the securitization were set at current subsidy
"target" levels, the government would have less cost to cover in a
securitization because of the elimination of direct payments and
because it could wait until post-harvest to honor its guarantees. The
floor price could be set lower in a securitization than the target price
currently is for subsidies, because of the added value of the
accelerated payment to producers. The exact savings of securitizing
commodities would depend heavily on market conditions, but the
heightened efficiency of a securitization could save the federal
government billions in the short-term. In the long-term,
securitization of commodities may completely obviate the need for
agricultural subsidies, as the private securitization market makes
inroads into agriculture similar to the mortgage market. 4 This would
be the ideal situation for producers, taxpayers, and the federal
government alike.
GALEN E. BOEREMA
252. See, e.g., supra Part I.C (outlining the information required to calculate payment
of subsidies under the current subsidization structure); supra note 187 (noting the weather
risk analysis tools already available to and administered by the federal government).
253. See supra note 79 (noting the existence and role of the FSA, which would be an
ideal agency to administer a federal securitization of commodities).
254. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. A similar invigoration of the
market in commodity-backed securitizations would be possible with government
sponsorship.
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